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- Paul Robert Milgrom (20 de abril de 1948) es un economista estadounidense. Es el titular de la cátedra Shirley y Leonard Ely de Humanidades y Ciencias en la Universidad de Stanford, cargo que ocupa desde 1987. El profesor Milgrom es un experto en teoría de juegos, específicamente en teoría de subastas y estrategias de fijación de precios. Es el cocreador del teorema del no intercambio con Nancy Stokey. Es el cofundador de varias compañías, la más reciente de las cuales, Auctionomics, proporciona software y servicios que crean mercados eficientes para subastas e intercambios comerciales complejos. Milgrom y su asesor de tesis Robert B. Wilson diseñaron el protocolo de subasta que utiliza la Comisión Federal de Comunicaciones para distribuir las frecuencias celulares entre las compañías telefónicas. (es)
- Paul Robert Milgrom (20 de abril de 1948) es un economista estadounidense. Es el titular de la cátedra Shirley y Leonard Ely de Humanidades y Ciencias en la Universidad de Stanford, cargo que ocupa desde 1987. El profesor Milgrom es un experto en teoría de juegos, específicamente en teoría de subastas y estrategias de fijación de precios. Es el cocreador del teorema del no intercambio con Nancy Stokey. Es el cofundador de varias compañías, la más reciente de las cuales, Auctionomics, proporciona software y servicios que crean mercados eficientes para subastas e intercambios comerciales complejos. Milgrom y su asesor de tesis Robert B. Wilson diseñaron el protocolo de subasta que utiliza la Comisión Federal de Comunicaciones para distribuir las frecuencias celulares entre las compañías telefónicas. (es)
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| prop-es:apellidos
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- Robert Weber (es)
- Paul Milgrom (es)
- John Roberts (es)
- Nancy Stokey (es)
- Budish, E., Che, Y.-K., Kojima, F., and Paul Milgrom (es)
- Ausubel, Lawrence M., Peter Cramton and Paul Milgrom (es)
- Abreu, D., Paul Milgrom, and David Pearce (es)
- Bruno Strulovici (es)
- Chris Shannon (es)
- Fudenberg, Drew, Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (es)
- Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast (es)
- Ilya Segal (es)
- Kreps, David, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson (es)
- Meyer, Margaret, Paul Milgrom, and John Roberts (es)
- Milgrom, Paul (es)
- Milgrom, Paul, Yingi Qian and John Roberts. (es)
- Milgrom,Paul and John Roberts (es)
- Bresnahan, Timothy F., Paul Milgrom, and Jonathan Paul (es)
- Paul R. Milgrom (es)
- Sharon Oster (es)
- Milgrom, Paul, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast (es)
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber (es)
- Robert Weber (es)
- Paul Milgrom (es)
- John Roberts (es)
- Nancy Stokey (es)
- Budish, E., Che, Y.-K., Kojima, F., and Paul Milgrom (es)
- Ausubel, Lawrence M., Peter Cramton and Paul Milgrom (es)
- Abreu, D., Paul Milgrom, and David Pearce (es)
- Bruno Strulovici (es)
- Chris Shannon (es)
- Fudenberg, Drew, Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (es)
- Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast (es)
- Ilya Segal (es)
- Kreps, David, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson (es)
- Meyer, Margaret, Paul Milgrom, and John Roberts (es)
- Milgrom, Paul (es)
- Milgrom, Paul, Yingi Qian and John Roberts. (es)
- Milgrom,Paul and John Roberts (es)
- Bresnahan, Timothy F., Paul Milgrom, and Jonathan Paul (es)
- Paul R. Milgrom (es)
- Sharon Oster (es)
- Milgrom, Paul, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast (es)
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber (es)
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- American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (es)
- Bell Journal of Economics (es)
- Economic Inquiry (es)
- Economics and Politics (es)
- European Economic Review (es)
- Games and Economic Behavior (es)
- Journal of Accounting and Economics (es)
- Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (es)
- Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (es)
- Journal of Mathematical Economics (es)
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- Output Measurement in the Services Sectors (es)
- Scandinavian Journal of Economics (es)
- The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (es)
- The RAND Journal of Economics (es)
- in Combinatorial Auctions, edited by Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., and Steinberg, R. (es)
- The American Economic Review (es)
- Journal of Economic Theory (es)
- American Journal of Sociology (es)
- American Economic Review (es)
- Quarterly Journal of Economics (es)
- Econometrica (es)
- Journal of Financial Economics (es)
- Journal of Political Economy (es)
- Journal of Economic Perspectives (es)
- The Journal of Economic Perspectives (es)
- International Journal of Game Theory (es)
- American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (es)
- Bell Journal of Economics (es)
- Economic Inquiry (es)
- Economics and Politics (es)
- European Economic Review (es)
- Games and Economic Behavior (es)
- Journal of Accounting and Economics (es)
- Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (es)
- Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (es)
- Journal of Mathematical Economics (es)
- Mathematics of Operations Research (es)
- Output Measurement in the Services Sectors (es)
- Scandinavian Journal of Economics (es)
- The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (es)
- The RAND Journal of Economics (es)
- in Combinatorial Auctions, edited by Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., and Steinberg, R. (es)
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| prop-es:título
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- Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities (es)
- Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior, and Industrial Organization (es)
- Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games With Strategic Complementarities (es)
- Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design (es)
- The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain (es)
- The Efficiency of Equity in Organizational Decision Processes (es)
- Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships (es)
- Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simulteneous Ascending Auction (es)
- Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design (es)
- Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis (es)
- The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization (es)
- Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes (es)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (es)
- An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge (es)
- Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (es)
- Ascending Proxy Auctions (es)
- Assignment Messages and Exchanges (es)
- Auctions and Bidding: A Primer (es)
- Axelrod's "The Evolution of Cooperation" (es)
- Comparing Equilibria (es)
- Competitive bidding and proprietary information (es)
- Core-selecting package auctions (es)
- Critical Issues in the Practice of Market Design (es)
- Economics, Organization and Management (es)
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (es)
- An Economic Approach to Influence Activities and Organizational Responses (es)
- Game theory and the spectrum auctions (es)
- Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships (es)
- Information, Trade and Common Knowledge (es)
- Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild (es)
- Matching with Contracts (es)
- Monotone Comparative Statics (es)
- Package Auctions and Exchanges (es)
- Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence (es)
- Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality (es)
- Putting Auction Theory to Work (es)
- Job Discrimination, Market Forces and the Invisibility Hypothesis (es)
- Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (es)
- Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium (es)
- The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Reply (es)
- The Firm as an Incentive System (es)
- The LeChatelier Principle (es)
- The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (es)
- The Real Output of the Stock Exchange (es)
- The Value of Information in a Sealed Bid Auction (es)
- Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure and Organizational Change in Manufacturing (es)
- Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design (es)
- Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (es)
- Communication and Inventories as Substitutes in Organizing Production (es)
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (es)
- Comparing Optima: Do Simplifying Assumptions Affect Conclusions? (es)
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions (es)
- Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis (es)
- Complementarities, Momentum, and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing (es)
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding (es)
- Bid, Ask and Transactions Prices in a Specialist Market with Insider Trading (es)
- The Structure of Information in Competitive Bidding (es)
- The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs (es)
- What the Seller Won't Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets (es)
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information (es)
- Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games (es)
- Rational Cooperation in the Finitely‑Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (es)
- The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (es)
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (es)
- Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (es)
- Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities (es)
- Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior, and Industrial Organization (es)
- Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games With Strategic Complementarities (es)
- Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design (es)
- The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain (es)
- The Efficiency of Equity in Organizational Decision Processes (es)
- Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships (es)
- Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simulteneous Ascending Auction (es)
- Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design (es)
- Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis (es)
- The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization (es)
- Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes (es)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (es)
- An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge (es)
- Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (es)
- Ascending Proxy Auctions (es)
- Assignment Messages and Exchanges (es)
- Auctions and Bidding: A Primer (es)
- Axelrod's "The Evolution of Cooperation" (es)
- Comparing Equilibria (es)
- Competitive bidding and proprietary information (es)
- Core-selecting package auctions (es)
- Critical Issues in the Practice of Market Design (es)
- Economics, Organization and Management (es)
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (es)
- An Economic Approach to Influence Activities and Organizational Responses (es)
- Game theory and the spectrum auctions (es)
- Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships (es)
- Information, Trade and Common Knowledge (es)
- Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild (es)
- Matching with Contracts (es)
- Monotone Comparative Statics (es)
- Package Auctions and Exchanges (es)
- Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence (es)
- Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality (es)
- Putting Auction Theory to Work (es)
- Job Discrimination, Market Forces and the Invisibility Hypothesis (es)
- Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (es)
- Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium (es)
- The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Reply (es)
- The Firm as an Incentive System (es)
- The LeChatelier Principle (es)
- The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (es)
- The Real Output of the Stock Exchange (es)
- The Value of Information in a Sealed Bid Auction (es)
- Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure and Organizational Change in Manufacturing (es)
- Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design (es)
- Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (es)
- Communication and Inventories as Substitutes in Organizing Production (es)
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (es)
- Comparing Optima: Do Simplifying Assumptions Affect Conclusions? (es)
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions (es)
- Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis (es)
- Complementarities, Momentum, and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing (es)
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding (es)
- Bid, Ask and Transactions Prices in a Specialist Market with Insider Trading (es)
- The Structure of Information in Competitive Bidding (es)
- The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs (es)
- What the Seller Won't Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets (es)
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information (es)
- Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games (es)
- Rational Cooperation in the Finitely‑Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (es)
- The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (es)
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (es)
- Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (es)
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| rdfs:comment
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- Paul Robert Milgrom (20 de abril de 1948) es un economista estadounidense. Es el titular de la cátedra Shirley y Leonard Ely de Humanidades y Ciencias en la Universidad de Stanford, cargo que ocupa desde 1987. El profesor Milgrom es un experto en teoría de juegos, específicamente en teoría de subastas y estrategias de fijación de precios. Es el cocreador del teorema del no intercambio con Nancy Stokey. Es el cofundador de varias compañías, la más reciente de las cuales, Auctionomics, proporciona software y servicios que crean mercados eficientes para subastas e intercambios comerciales complejos. (es)
- Paul Robert Milgrom (20 de abril de 1948) es un economista estadounidense. Es el titular de la cátedra Shirley y Leonard Ely de Humanidades y Ciencias en la Universidad de Stanford, cargo que ocupa desde 1987. El profesor Milgrom es un experto en teoría de juegos, específicamente en teoría de subastas y estrategias de fijación de precios. Es el cocreador del teorema del no intercambio con Nancy Stokey. Es el cofundador de varias compañías, la más reciente de las cuales, Auctionomics, proporciona software y servicios que crean mercados eficientes para subastas e intercambios comerciales complejos. (es)
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| rdfs:label
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- Paul Milgrom (es)
- Paul Milgrom (es)
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