This HTML5 document contains 290 embedded RDF statements represented using HTML+Microdata notation.

The embedded RDF content will be recognized by any processor of HTML5 Microdata.

Subject Item

dbr:Paul_Milgrom

owl:sameAs

dbpedia-es:Paul_Milgrom

Subject Item

dbpedia-es:Paul_Milgrom

rdfs:label

Paul Milgrom

rdfs:comment

Paul Robert Milgrom (20 de abril de 1948) es un economista estadounidense. Es el titular de la cátedra Shirley y Leonard Ely de Humanidades y Ciencias en la Universidad de Stanford, cargo que ocupa desde 1987. El profesor Milgrom es un experto en teoría de juegos, específicamente en teoría de subastas y estrategias de fijación de precios. Es el cocreador del teorema del no intercambio con Nancy Stokey. Es el cofundador de varias compañías, la más reciente de las cuales, Auctionomics,​ proporciona software y servicios que crean mercados eficientes para subastas e intercambios comerciales complejos.

dct:subject

category-es:Personas_vivas category-es:Alumnado_de_la_Universidad_Stanford category-es:Laureados_con_el_Premio_Nobel_2020 category-es:Laureados_con_el_Premio_del_Banco_de_Suecia_en_Ciencias_Económicas_en_memoria_de_Alfred_Nobel category-es:Economistas_matemáticos category-es:Teóricos_de_juegos category-es:Miembros_de_la_Academia_Nacional_de_Ciencias_de_Estados_Unidos category-es:Alumnado_de_la_Universidad_de_Míchigan

foaf:isPrimaryTopicOf

wikipedia-es:Paul_Milgrom

prop-es:apellidos

Abreu, D., Paul Milgrom, and David Pearce Paul Milgrom Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast Milgrom,Paul and John Roberts Budish, E., Che, Y.-K., Kojima, F., and Paul Milgrom Nancy Stokey Ausubel, Lawrence M., Peter Cramton and Paul Milgrom Kreps, David, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson Milgrom, Paul Meyer, Margaret, Paul Milgrom, and John Roberts Chris Shannon John Roberts Paul R. Milgrom Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber Ilya Segal Milgrom, Paul, Yingi Qian and John Roberts. Robert Weber Sharon Oster Bresnahan, Timothy F., Paul Milgrom, and Jonathan Paul Bruno Strulovici Milgrom, Paul, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast Fudenberg, Drew, Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom

prop-es:año

1979 1982 1983 1981 1994 1995 1992 1998 1996 1986 1987 1984 1985 1990 1991 1988 1989 2010 2011 2008 2009 2013 2002 2000 2006 2007 2004 2005

prop-es:doi

101086 101093 101257 101111 101287 101006 101007 101016 102202 102307

prop-es:editorial

Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 2 New York: Garland Press Cambridge University Press Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 5 Prentice Hall

prop-es:isbn

132246503 0

prop-es:número

100 4 5 6 1 2 3

prop-es:publicación

Quarterly Journal of Economics International Journal of Game Theory Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Bell Journal of Economics Journal of Political Economy Output Measurement in the Services Sectors Journal of Financial Economics European Economic Review Games and Economic Behavior American Economic Review Scandinavian Journal of Economics The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Econometrica Journal of Law, Economics and Organization Journal of Economic Theory The RAND Journal of Economics in Combinatorial Auctions, edited by Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., and Steinberg, R. Economic Inquiry Journal of Accounting and Economics American Economic Journal: Microeconomics The Journal of Economic Perspectives The American Economic Review Mathematics of Operations Research Journal of Mathematical Economics Journal of Economic Perspectives American Journal of Sociology Economics and Politics

prop-es:páginas

157 154 443 441 1089 173 160 161 453 921 184 913 179 935 195 219 511 212 972 679 245 280 1653 275 303 997 9 3 S154-S179 1 18 745 311 17 42 305 771 796 62 71 95 1255 380 84 82 1713 105 585 115 583 113 393 607 603 619

prop-es:título

Package Auctions and Exchanges Assignment Messages and Exchanges Auctions and Bidding: A Primer Monotone Comparative Statics Axelrod's "The Evolution of Cooperation" The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction Core-selecting package auctions Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding The Structure of Information in Competitive Bidding Economics, Organization and Management Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization Critical Issues in the Practice of Market Design Competitive bidding and proprietary information The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information Rational Cooperation in the Finitely‑Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma Game theory and the spectrum auctions The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design Matching with Contracts Communication and Inventories as Substitutes in Organizing Production The Real Output of the Stock Exchange Ascending Proxy Auctions Job Discrimination, Market Forces and the Invisibility Hypothesis An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Reply The Firm as an Incentive System The LeChatelier Principle Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design The Efficiency of Equity in Organizational Decision Processes The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives What the Seller Won't Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure and Organizational Change in Manufacturing Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications The Value of Information in a Sealed Bid Auction A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design Putting Auction Theory to Work Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games With Strategic Complementarities An Economic Approach to Influence Activities and Organizational Responses Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simulteneous Ascending Auction Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis Bid, Ask and Transactions Prices in a Specialist Market with Insider Trading Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships Comparing Equilibria Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild Information, Trade and Common Knowledge Complementarities, Momentum, and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications Comparing Optima: Do Simplifying Assumptions Affect Conclusions? Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding Relying on the Information of Interested Parties Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior, and Industrial Organization

prop-es:url

n5:economicsorganiz00milg

prop-es:volumen

108 98 96 102 103 100 90 94 95 82 80 81 86 84 85 75 77 70 144 58 59 62 50 51 49 55 42 47 36 26 27 19 17 22 10 11 14 15 12 2 3 1 7

dbo:wikiPageID

8225473

dbo:wikiPageRevisionID

130390738

dbo:wikiPageExternalLink

n5:economicsorganiz00milg vimeo:7525251 n10:html n11:9686 n15:net n20:html

dbo:wikiPageLength

67927

prov:wasDerivedFrom

n17:0

dbo:abstract

Paul Robert Milgrom (20 de abril de 1948) es un economista estadounidense. Es el titular de la cátedra Shirley y Leonard Ely de Humanidades y Ciencias en la Universidad de Stanford, cargo que ocupa desde 1987. El profesor Milgrom es un experto en teoría de juegos, específicamente en teoría de subastas y estrategias de fijación de precios. Es el cocreador del teorema del no intercambio con Nancy Stokey. Es el cofundador de varias compañías, la más reciente de las cuales, Auctionomics,​ proporciona software y servicios que crean mercados eficientes para subastas e intercambios comerciales complejos. Milgrom y su asesor de tesis Robert B. Wilson diseñaron el protocolo de subasta que utiliza la Comisión Federal de Comunicaciones para distribuir las frecuencias celulares entre las compañías telefónicas.

Subject Item

wikipedia-es:Paul_Milgrom

foaf:primaryTopic

dbpedia-es:Paul_Milgrom

Subject Item

n14:_Milgrom

dbo:wikiPageRedirects

dbpedia-es:Paul_Milgrom